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Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on the price effects of horizontal mergers. The majority 
of mergers that have been examined in the nine studies conducted over the past 22 years resulted in 
increased prices for both the merging parties and rival firms, at least in the short run. There is some 
evidence that product prices increase after mergers are announced but before they are 
consummated. 
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This paper surveys the literature on the price e®ects of horizontal mergers. The
majority of mergers that have been examined in the nine studies conducted over
the past 22 years resulted in increased prices for both the merging parties and rival
¯rms, at least in the short run. There is some evidence that product prices increase
after mergers are announced but before they are consummated.
1 Introduction
From 1988 through 2005, over 46,000 intentions to merge were ¯led with the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice in accordance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act. The agencies review these mergers in an e®ort to identify and block mergers if they
would increase prices. The vast majority of these mergers are allowed to pass without
modi¯cation. On average, 3.8% of mergers were required to answer second requests for
more information regarding the transaction each year from 1988-2005.1
When reviewing mergers, the antitrust authorities focus on the tradeo® between the
costs of allowing the creation of monopoly power with the bene¯ts of e±ciency gains
that may be passed through to consumers. Mergers are to be blocked if they result in
price increases. Three di®erent approaches are used to evaluate the competitive e®ects
of horizontal mergers: event studies, merger simulations, and direct before and after
comparisons of prices.
¤Assistant Professor of Economics. University of Georgia, Brooks Hall, mweinber@terry.uga.edu. I
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1These ¯gures were obtained from the 1997 and 2005 and FTC/DOJ Annual Report to Congress.
1Beginning with Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) a large number of papers have used
event studies to analyze the abnormal stock market performance of merging parties and
their rivals around the time of merger announcements and antitrust challenges. If a merger
were to result in higher prices and thus a transfer of surplus away from consumers and
towards ¯rms, there would be an increase in the equity value of the merging parties and
their rivals. If the antitrust authorities announced an attempt to block such a merger,
there would be negative abnormal returns for rival ¯rms and, obviously, the merging par-
ties. Eckbo ¯nds that in his sample, rivals exhibited positive abnormal returns around
antitrust challenges and conclude that these mergers were not anticompetitive. Stillman
¯nds that most of the rival ¯rms in his sample demonstrated no abnormal returns on
the dates of events that would impact the probability of those mergers being consum-
mated and concludes these mergers were not anticompetitive. The mergers studied in
these papers occurred before the passage of the HSR Act in 1976. Before the HSR Act,
¯rms did not have to notify the agencies before merging and wait for a review prior to
coordinating activity. Eckbo & Weir (1985) study mergers that occurred after the HSR
act and ¯nd that the abnormal returns of rival ¯rms actually increased around the time of
antitrust complaints. They argue that antitrust policy tends to block mergers that would
be e±cient, and that the HSR Act did not improve the government's ability to prevent
anticompetitive mergers. While simple in design and intuitive, these studies are contro-
versial for three reasons. First, the informational content of merger announcements and
antitrust challenges is not clear. For example, a merger announcement may inform stock
market participants that industry wide e±ciencies will soon be realized and this would
be expected to generate positive abnormal returns as well (Mulherin & Mitchell 1996).
Furthermore, it is not easy to determine exactly when stock market participants become
aware of potential mergers and antitrust challenges. Finally, McAfee & Williams (1988)
argue that the high variance of stock returns of large rival ¯rms that receive a relatively
2small proportion of their pro¯ts from the market a®ected by the merger makes event
study tests for anticompetitive mergers of little power.
Using demand estimates together with an assumption of Bertrand competition and
constant marginal costs has become a common way of predicting the competitive e®ects of
mergers ((Hausman, Leonard & Zona 1994), (Nevo 2000), (Werden & Froeb 2006)). These
models allow simulation of the price e®ects of mergers, but rely on strong assumptions
on demand, costs, and conduct. These assumptions have been tested by Peters (2006)
and Weinberg (2006) through comparing indirect, simulated price changes with direct
estimates of the price e®ects of mergers. Both papers ¯nd that merger simulations did
not accurately predict actual post-merger prices. Further, these papers and work by Slade
(forthcoming) and Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz & Werden (2003) demonstrate that simulated
price changes are very sensitive to exactly which variant of the model is used.
A growing number of papers have directly looked at prices before and after mergers
occurred to estimate the e®ects of mergers on prices. These papers include both industry
studies that estimate the average e®ect of a merger on prices within a speci¯c industry
and individual case studies. Table 1 lists these studies and their principal ¯ndings. While
it is not straightforward to use these studies for predicting anticompetitive mergers and
care must be taken in constructing a control group, before and after comparisons of prices
and do not su®er from as many of the strong economic assumptions required by the event
study or simulation approach and are the most credible way of assessing the competitive
e®ects of completed mergers.
This paper provides a survey of the results from direct estimates of the impact of
mergers on prices2. Section 2 presents the evidence on price increases of the products
controlled by merging ¯rms, Section 3 presents the evidence on the price increases of rival
¯rms, Section 4 discusses the timing of price changes, Section 5 discusses characteristics
2For a broader survey that covers event studies and simulations as well, see Pautler (2001) or Whinston
(2006).
3of mergers and merging parties associated with price increases, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Price Changes of Merging Parties' Products
The 1997 revision to the Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission Merger Guide-
lines states that mergers will be permitted if veri¯able e±ciencies `would be su±cient to
reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by pre-
venting price increases in the market.' The courts also make their decisions based upon a
consumer welfare standard. Antitrust policy has the goal of blocking mergers that would
increase prices. This section serves as an introduction to the various studies of the price
e®ects of mergers, and summarizes the evidence on price changes of the merging ¯rms'
products.
Estimating the impact of mergers on prices is challenging for several reasons. Simply
comparing average prices for the ¯rms directly involved in a merger before and after
the merger occurred will lead to biased estimates of the merger e®ect if factors a®ecting
demand or costs are changing concurrently. For this reason, most studies of mergers have
compared the changes in product prices of the merging ¯rms with changes in prices of
other ¯rms. If the comparison group's prices evolve in the same way they would have
had the merger not occurred, this di®erence-in-di®erences will estimate the impact of the
merger on prices.
Kim & Singal (1993) examine 14 airline mergers from 1985 to 1988 and estimate the
e®ect of a merger on fares. The airline industry lends itself well to constructing a control
group as the route between each city-pair is arguably a separate market, and not all
airlines compete in each of these market. Kim & Singal compare the change in fares on
routes serviced by merging ¯rms with the change in fares on routes of a similar distance
in which none of the merging parties operated. Over the entire period spanned by their
data, they ¯nd that fares increased by 9.44% and report that this was signi¯cant at the
4.01 level.
Prager & Hannan (1998) provide evidence on the e®ects of mergers in the U.S. banking
industry on deposit account interest rates. Using monthly data from 1991 to 1994, they
identi¯ed banking mergers by looking for large changes in the concentration of regional
markets in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp's annual summary of deposits data. If a bank
experienced a change in the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) greater than 100 points to
a level exceeding 1400 points the bank was examined further for evidence that it merged.
If the post-merger HHI exceeded 1800 points, the merger was de¯ned as `substantial',
and the possibility that mergers could be missed due to simultaneously occurring events
that would prevent the HHI from becoming large is acknowledged (mergers occurring
simultaneously with entry, for example). They estimate the e®ects of mergers by com-
paring changes in deposit rates of banks located in markets where there were mergers
with changes in rates of banks not operating in such markets. Three types of accounts
over which di®erent amounts of market power could plausibly be exercised were analyzed:
interest-bearing checking accounts called NOW accounts, personal money market deposit
accounts, and three-month certi¯cates of deposit. They ¯nd that interest rates fell by 18
percent for NOW accounts, by 10 percent for money market accounts, and by a small
and statistically insigni¯cant amount for the certi¯cates of deposit in markets that were
a®ected by mergers. This pattern of interest rate changes is supported by Prager and
Hannan's argument that access to bank branches is most important for NOW accounts,
while banks' abilities to exploit market power when setting interest rates for 3-month CDs
are constrained by competition from lenders outside the local market.
Datasets such as those used in the industry studies of mergers described above are
rarely available. Barton & Sherman (1984) provide a case study of mergers in the micro-
¯lm industry. This paper studies the price e®ects of Xidex Corporation's acquisitions of
the micro¯lm businesses of Scott Graphics and Kalvar Corporation. Barton and Sherman
5study the price changes of two types of micro¯lm. Xidex produced both types, while Scott
Graphics and Kalvar each produced one type that di®ered across them. They compare
the relative price changes of these two types of micro¯lm before and after the merger and
estimated price e®ects of 12 and 23% for the two merger.
Borenstein (1990) separately examined the e®ects of the Northwest and Republic air-
lines, and Trans World Airline's merger with Ozark airlines. These mergers were both
initially discussed in 1985, and the Department of Transportation approved an October
1986 merger date for the Northwest-Republic merger in August of 1986 and the TWA-
Ozark merger in September of 1986. Both of these mergers involved airlines that carried
large shares of the total enplanements from their major hubs, yet the price e®ects of the
two mergers were quite di®erent. Using fare prices for each ¯rm in each city-pair market
for the third quarter of 1985, 1986, and 1987, Borenstein reported the average percentage
fare change from 1985 to 1987 to be 9.5% relative to industry averages across the 84
routes including Northwest/Republic's hub of Minneapolis/St. Paul. In contrast to the
experience of Northwest/Republic, little evidence of an increase in prices resulted from
the TWA/Ozark Airlines merger. The reason for these dissimilar outcomes is unclear,
but potentially due to a negative demand shock in the St. Louis market.
McCabe (2002) provides case studies of several mergers of publishers of biomedical
journals. He points out that, at ¯rst glance, one might suppose that each academic
journal makes up a unique market, and if this is the case there should be no price increase
as a result of a merger according to the standard theory. However, McCabe claims that
librarians choose which journals to order by constructing cost per use ratios based upon
the subscription price and the number of times the journals are used per year, and then
selection the journals with the lowest cost per use ratio until they meet their budget. This
creates competition for budget dollars of libraries, and the prediction that ¯rms holding
larger portfolios of journals will charge higher prices. This theory is supported by the
6price increases he found for journal titles produced by the merging ¯rms. His data covers
a time period in which several mergers occurred, the ¯rst of which was Wolters Kluwer's
purchase of Lippincott's 15 journals to supplement the 75 they already owned. The next
event studied was Reed Elsevier's acquisition of Pergamon. This merger was the largest
examined by McCabe in the sense that Elsevier the ¯rms owned 190 titles and Pergamon
57. The price e®ects of both of these mergers were studied by comparing their price
changes with the change in prices of other biomedical journals. Using data from 1988 to
1994, it was found that the Wolters Kluwers/Lippincott merger resulted in an increase
in prices of 5 percent relative to average journal prices and the Reed Elsevier/Pergamon
merger was estimated to have caused prices to increase by a larger 10 percent, which
is consistent with the prediction of McCabe's model that larger portfolios will lead to
higher prices. McCabe also studies the price e®ects of a sequence of acquisitions made
by Churchill Livingstone, which purchased Harcourt in September of 1997 and Mosby
in October of 1998. Churchill Livingstone owned 17 journals, Harcourt owned 118, and
Mosby owned 27. Also in 1998, Wolters Kluwers, which then owned 112 titles, purchased
the 22 titles of Plennum in July, 41 titles of Thomson in February, and 37 of Waverly's in
May. When treating these two sets of acquisitions as single events and using data from
1995-2001 it was found that they both were associated with an increase in prices relative
to changes in average journal prices during that time of between 2 and 6 percent.
A large amount of merger activity has occurred in branded consumer product indus-
tries. In 2005, 29.4% of acquired entities that ¯led under the HSR act were classi¯ed as
belonging to the consumer goods industry group, up dramatically from 11.5% in 2004 and
12% in 2003 3. Ashenfelter & Hosken (2004) analyze price e®ects resulting from mergers
in the feminine hygiene product, distilled spirit, motor oil, ready to eat cereal, and break-
fast syrup industries. Each merger they consider is involves products sold nationally, and
therefore it is not possible to form a comparison group from regional markets una®ected
3These ¯gures were obtained from the 2003, 2004, and 2005 FTC/DOJ Annual Report to Congress.
7by merger as in some of the previously discussed studies. Instead, most similar to Mc-
Cabe, in their preferred speci¯cation they compare the price changes of products sold by
the merging ¯rms with price changes of private label products. They drop data generated
from within three months of when ¯rms were legally allowed to coordinate their pricing
decisions to avoid issues of timing, and generally ¯nd that price changes were the result
of these mergers. Only the breakfast syrup merger involving the ¯rms that produce Mrs.
Butterworth and Log Cabin brand syrups did not cause signi¯cant price increases.
The high price of gas in recent times has created much interest in research into whether
or not petroleum mergers have contributed to increases. Hosken & Taylor (2006) examine
the price e®ects of the joint venture of Marathon and Ashland to form the Marathon
Ashland Petroleum Company. This transaction led to the consolidation of seven re¯neries
(four of which were owned by Marathon and three by Ashland), 84 terminals, 5,400 gas
stations, and 5,000 miles of pipeline. There were thus potential anticompetitive e®ects at
the retail, wholesale, and re¯ning levels of the market. Kentucky was the only state in
which both Marathon and Ashland were among the top four suppliers, and Hosken and
Taylor identify Louisville as the most likely region to experience anticompetitive harm
from the merger. A di®erence-in-di®erence approach is used to estimate the e®ect of
the merger on both wholesale and retail prices where other markets that arguably face
similar demand and supply conditions were used as control groups. These other markets
included Chicago, Houston, and northern Virginia. The di®erence-in-di®erence model was
estimated separately for each of the di®erent control regions, and no signi¯cant e®ect was
found on retail prices. Wholesale prices, however, increased by rough 5 cents per gallon
15 months after the transaction. This implies a reduction in retail margins of between 20
and 30 percent.
In summary, of the 14 case studies of individual mergers, 11 were estimated to have
resulted in higher prices charged by the merging parties. The industry studies of Kim
8and Singal in the airline industry, Prager and Hannan in U.S. banking and Focarelli and
Panetta in Italian banking also estimate that mergers have increased product prices, at
least in the short-run.
3 Timing of Price Changes
Most merger retrospectives have found increases in prices as a result of mergers. Many of
them also report evidence on the timing of these price changes. This is useful information
for at least two reasons. First, while it is widely recognized that reductions in marginal
costs might result from merger, little is known about when these cost savings might be
realized. It is possible that the studies described in the previous section are only able
to measure short run e®ects of merger and not the e®ects of cost savings which occur
longer after the ¯rms are allowed to coordinate. Second, there is some evidence that
merging ¯rms have increased their prices before the date at which they're legally allowed
to coordinate their operations, a fact di±cult to explain by standard theories.
In their study of banking mergers, Panetta & Focarelli have data covering a long
enough time period to permit a separation of the merger e®ect on interest rates into one
speci¯c to the ¯rst three years afterwards and another speci¯c to the next three years
afterwards. They ¯nd evidence that mergers actually increased interest rates for deposits
in the long run. The e®ect over the ¯rst three years was to decrease rates by 13.5 basis
points, and the e®ect over the next three years was to increase rates by 12.6 points. They
¯nd no evidence of a merger e®ect before completion dates. The ¯nding of no anticipatory
`price increases' is a result in contrast to those found in the Prager & Hannan study of
banking mergers in the U.S. They ¯nd that half of the e®ect of the merger on interest
rates occurred pre-merger for interest bearing checking accounts, and that for personal
money market deposit accounts 16 percent of the total price e®ect occurred pre-merger.
Data as rich as that used in the Panetta & Focarelli study is rare, and other studies
9have been able to only look at price changes within a relatively short interval around
merger dates. Kim & Singal separate the e®ect of mergers into two periods: the an-
nouncement period, which is the quarter the successful bidder could be identi¯ed in the
press, and the completion period, which is the quarter in which the acquiring ¯rm be-
gins running the target ¯rm. They hypothesize that e±ciency gains will not be realized
until the completion period, but the ability to exercise market power will begin in the
announcement period. While they only look one quarter after the mergers were com-
pleted, this is supported by their ¯nding that relative fares increased by 5.54 percent in
the announcement period but did not change during the completion period for the seven
out of the fourteen mergers in which there was a large enough gap between announcement
and completion to make this calculation with quarterly data. Borenstein also provides
evidence of anticipatory increases in price before the mergers of Northwest and Republic
airlines. These airlines were granted permission to merge by the Department of Trans-
portation in August of 1986, but management met to discuss the transaction in 1985. He
reports that the fares charged by these airlines were 14.7 percent above industry averages
in the third quarter of 1985, and 21.5 percent higher in the third quarter of 1986.
Standard unilateral e®ects models are unable to explain price increases occurring be-
fore the merging parties are allowed to legally coordinate their operations. Because the
merging parties are not yet one ¯rm, there is an incentive to deviate from charging the
price that maximizes joint pro¯ts at any point in time before the HSR waiting period is
over. Yet three di®erent studies have found product price increases before mergers were
actually completed. One explanation for this is that these studies focused on the banking
and airline industries, which both produce products with substantial consumer switching
costs. In standard models of switching costs (Klemperer 1995), ¯rms initially price low
in order to gain market share. Switching costs lock in these consumers, and their surplus
is extracted later through increasing prices. If managers of a ¯rm know that they will be
10acquired, the incentive to invest in market share is lost because they may lose their job as
a result of restructuring and not realize the return from investing in future market share.
Prices would rise as soon as management knows that it may be taken over. When new
management takes over, the model would predict that prices would again fall. This is an
alternative explanation for the price patterns observed in the Kim and Singal, Prager and
Hannan, and Borenstein studies.
4 Price Changes of Rivals
Consumer welfare depends upon prices charged by all ¯rms in the market. Oligopoly
models used to analyze mergers predict that in theory rival ¯rms will increase their prices
too (Deneckere & Davidson 1985). This section presents the evidence on rivals' responses.
Prager & Hannan ¯nd that, when allowing the e®ect of merger to di®erentially impact
participants and rivals, that interest rates on savings accounts decreased similarly across
these two groups. This was true across each of the account type considered in their study.
Panetta & Focarelli, however, ¯nd little evidence of price changes by rival ¯rms during
the ¯rst three years following mergers in the banking industry. This e®ect changed in the
following three years, during which their interest rates decreased by 6 percent. As it was
found that the merging ¯rms interest rates ¯rst decreased and then increased, the authors
argue that the results for rival ¯rms further supports their argument that e±ciency gains
were realized and passed on to consumers only in the long run.
The airline studies both report large price changes by rival ¯rms as well. In fact, Kim
& Singal estimate that rival ¯rms actually increased their fares 12.17 percent whereas
the merging parties increased their fares by only 9.44 percent. When this is broken up
into the announcement and completion periods as described in the previous section, they
¯nd that both merging parties and rivals increased their prices by about 5 percent in
the announcement period. However, over the completion period the rivals increased their
11prices by 6 percent while the merging ¯rms' fares remained the same. This authors take
this as evidence that the merging ¯rms passed cost savings resulting from the merger on
to consumers in the form of lower fares. Borenstein also reports that rival ¯rms increased
their prices in a similar way to merging ¯rms on routes in which they were in competition
with merging ¯rms.
Ashenfelter & Hosken (2004) were interested in determining if mergers resulted in
higher prices for merging ¯rms, and in their preferred speci¯cation estimated this e®ect
by comparing price changes of merging ¯rms' products with price changes of private label
products. When making this comparison with other branded products, the magnitude of
their estimates drops in the motor oil, feminine hygiene, and distilled spirits markets, but
not in the cereal and syrup markets. This implies that the prices of other branded products
rose over time more dramatically than the prices of private label products. These issues
are explored further in Weinberg (2006). The principle objective of this paper was testing
if a model of Bertrand competition in di®erentiated product markets could accurately
simulate price changes resulting from a merger in motor oil industry and the breakfast
syrup industry. This model predicts price changes for non-merging ¯rms as well, and in
that study their price changes were explicitly examined relative to the price changes of
private label products. It was found that in the syrup industry, the rival ¯rms did not
change their prices, as was found for the merging ¯rms. In the oil industry, positive price
increases ranging from 3 to 6 percent were estimated for four of the rival ¯rms' products
and one price actually fell by 6 percent. The private label prices remained the same before
and after the merger occurred in both industries.
125 Characteristics of Mergers that Led to Price In-
creases
Standard theory (Willig, Salop & Scherer 1991) predicts that anticompetitive e®ects are
more likely the larger the merger and the more concentrated the market. It has also been
suggested that larger ¯rms in the airline industry are more able to deter entry onto routes
involving the merged ¯rms' hub airport, and that a merger may result in higher prices
through resulting in an increase in multi-market contact (Whinston 2006).
Focusing on °ights out of the merging ¯rms' hub airports, Borenstein looks at fare
changes of the merging ¯rms °ights relative to industry averages by four di®erent market
structure. Speci¯cally, he examines fare changes on routes that were a duopoly between
the merging ¯rms before merger and became a monopoly, routes that both merging parties
competed along with other ¯rms, routes on which one of the merging ¯rms was a monopoly
before and after merger, and routes in which one of the merging ¯rms competed with
outside parties. As might be expected, the largest price change occurred in markets
where the merger was for monopoly in the Northwest/Republic merger. The fares of
the merging ¯rms in these markets increased by 23 percent relative to industry averages.
Perhaps surprisingly, in the Northwest/Republic merger prices also increased signi¯cantly
in both the economic and statistical sense on routes in which only one of the merging
¯rms operated, both alone and with competitors. This could be explained by the merger
resulting in an increased ability of the merging ¯rms to deter entry into routes involving
their hub airport, or an increase in the ability to tacitly collude due to more multi-market
contact (Bernheim & Whinston 1990).
In their extension of Borenstein's study of airline mergers, Kim and Singal also analyze
price changes by di®erent market structures. They partition the routes in their sample
into one of four di®erent categories: routes with a common hub at the same airport
13and that was served be both merging parties, routes with a common hub at the same
airport that was served by only one of the merging parties, routes without a common
hub on which both ¯rms competed, and routes in which the ¯rms did not both operate
nor connected to a common hub. They ¯nd, for normal ¯rms, that prices increased the
most on the routes which did not share a common hub and only one of the merging ¯rms.
They also ¯nd increases in fares during the announcement period that were o®set by fare
decreases, arguably due to e±ciency gains, during the completion period. These ¯ndings
on the timing of price changes across di®erent market structures are exactly reversed for
mergers with a failing ¯rm; they tend to decrease their prices during the announcement
period and increase them during the completion period. Again in contrast to the ¯ndings
for normal ¯rm mergers, over the full sample mergers involving a failing ¯rm increased
their fares by the most on routes with a common hub on which both ¯rms competed
and the least on routes which did not share a common hub and were operated on by
only one of the merging parties. Kim and Singal also explicitly correlate fare changes
with concentration as measured by the HHI. They ¯nd, as predicted by the theory, that
concentration changes are positively correlated with fare changes. This result holds for
mergers between both normal and failing ¯rms and for rival ¯rms in both settings as well.
Prager and Hannan also estimate the e®ects of `less substantial' mergers on interest
rates. These are mergers that did not qualify as substantial as de¯ned in section II, but in
which the pro forma increase in the HHI was at least 100 points to a post-merger level of
at least 1400 points. These mergers were found to actually increase interest rates by about
10 percent for NOW accounts and by 6 percent for 3 month certi¯cates of deposit. There
was no e®ect on interest rates of money market accounts. This suggests that e±ciency
gains outweighed gains in market power for these smaller mergers.
146 Conclusions
The papers reviewed in this paper show that several mergers have resulted in increased
market power and reductions in consumer welfare. However, most of the studies have been
able to look at the impact in a relatively small window about merger dates. It may be
the case that the studies of mergers reviewed in this study are unable to capture eventual
e±ciency gains as the evidence from Italian banking provided by Panetta & Focarelli
suggests. Pre-merger price changes have been found in three of the merger retrospectives,
which is di±cult to explain with standard unilateral e®ects theory.
The merger retrospectives reviewed in this study do not constitute a random sample
of U.S. mergers, and not all were subject to the scrutiny of the antitrust authorities.
Authors such as Ashenfelter & Hosken have focused on approved mergers that looked
most anticompetitive a priori. The hospital merger considered by Vita & Sacher was
small enough that the Hart-Scott-Rodino tests did not apply and the government was
not noti¯ed. It is possible that the majority of the mergers passed do not result in price
increases, but the most direct evidence available on the price e®ects of mergers suggests
that a stronger anti-merger policy on the margin would better protect consumer welfare.
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D.V.=Price ratio of two
types of micro¯lm. Con-







Case study of Northwest-
Republic and TWA-
Ozark Airline Mergers
D.V.=Fares on routes in-
volving ¯rm's hub. Con-
trol group: Prices for
routes of similar dis-
tance. Fares increased








terly data from 1985-
1988. 14 mergers, 5 of
them involved ¯nancially
distressed ¯rms
D.V.=log of fares. Con-
trol group: routes on
which no merging ¯rm
operated and distance
within 7.5% of sample
route. Reported e®ect is
over entire period. Ri-
val price changes simi-












on about 500 banks from
October 1991-August
1994. 7 mergers in
sample
D.V.=Log of inter-
est rates on di®erent
personal banking ac-
counts. Control group:
Banks in regions where
















Merger occurred in ¯rst
quarter of 1990.
D.V.=Average net rev-
enue per inpatient acute-
care admission for the
privately insured. Con-
trol group: Other CA
hospitals with similar
number of beds, size, lo-
cation, and not located














Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis when available.
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Study Industry Methodology and Com-
ments
Price E®ects
McCabe(2002) Case study of publisher
mergers. Yearly price
data for about 900 bio-
mdedical journals from
1988-2001. 2 merger
events in 1990-1991, 2 in
1997-1998.
D.V.=Log of price. Con-


















deposit rate data from
1990 to 1998 by province
for banks. On average 67






relative interest rates on
current accounts. Break
up e®ect into that of
¯rst two years and that
of three or more years.
Control for total assets,
ratio of bad loans to to-
tal lending, cost-income
ratio, GDP per capita,
bank entry dummy, and


















Private label motor oils.
Dropped data within 3
months of merger date.









Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis when available.
20Table 3: Summary of Merger Retrospectives (continued)
Ashenfelter and
Hosken (2004)









D.V.=log of average rev-
enue weighted by revenue
shares. Control group:
Private label liners, pads,
and tampons. Dropped
data within 3 months of
merger date. Used equal























data within 3 months
of merger date. Used























data within 3 months
of merger date. Used























Dropped data within 3
months of merger date.






















rately for di®erent af-
fected regions. Control
groups: Similar regions.













Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis when available.
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